April 7

No Undue Hardship Waiver for Medicaid Recipient’s Estate that Sold House Before Waiver Was Requested

Reversing a trial court, a Michigan court of appeals holds that the estate of a Medicaid recipient is not entitled to an undue hardship exception to estate recovery applicable to estates with houses of modest value because the house had been sold before the hardship waiver was requested. Ketchum v. Department of Health and Human Services (Mich. Ct. App., No. 324741, March 1, 2016).

Wilma Ketchum received Medicaid benefits until her death. After she died, her house was sold for less than half the average value of other houses in the county. The state filed a claim to recover Medicaid benefits paid on her behalf. Ms. Ketchum’s estate denied the claim, arguing that it was entitled to a hardship waiver. Under state law, an undue hardship exists if the estate consists of a home of modest value. State regulations provide that hardship waivers are temporary and expire when the reason for the waiver no longer exists.

The state denied the estate’s request for a hardship waiver because the house had been sold before the waiver was requested. The estate appealed, and an administrative law judge ruled in favor of the state. The trial court reversed, holding that state law required an exemption for houses valued at equal to or less than 50 percent of the average price of a home, and that regulations limiting that exemption were not valid. The state appealed.

The Michigan Court of Appeals reverses, holding that the undue hardship waiver did not apply because the house had been sold. According to the court, once a house has been sold and “turned to cash, the condition that caused the undue hardship, the presence of a home of modest value, no longer exists and the ability to obtain an undue hardship waiver necessarily expires.”

For the full text of this decision, go to: http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov:81/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20160301_C324741_67_324741.OPN.PDF

April 4

Medicaid Applicants Entitled to Post-Default Notice Before Case Is Abandoned

A U.S. district court reverses a previous decision and grants a preliminary injunction to a group of Medicaid applicants who argued they are entitled to a post-default notice before their Medicaid application is considered abandoned. Fishman v. Daines (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. N.Y., No. 09-cv-5248(JFB)(ARL), Mar. 4, 2016).

Once New York State determines a Medicaid applicant is no longer entitled to Medicaid, it sends a letter notifying the applicant that he or she may request a fair hearing. The state then sends two more letters, notifying applicants that a fair hearing has been requested and scheduled. If an applicant misses the hearing, a default judgment will be entered against him or her.

Two Medicaid applicants initiated a class action against the state of New York, claiming that the state does not provide proper notice before entering a default judgment. The applicants asked for a preliminary injunction, requiring the state to mail a default notice to applicants before their appeals are abandoned. The state Medicaid manual provides that a case is considered abandoned after the applicant misses a hearing and does not respond to a mailing inquiring whether the applicant wishes further action. The U.S. district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that the applicants received sufficient notice. The applicants appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, ordering the district court to consider whether the rights conferred in the federal regulations governing dismissal of appeals are broader than what is guaranteed by the due process clause.

The U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, grants the preliminary injunction, holding that the applicants have shown a likelihood of success on the merits based on federal and state regulations. According to the court, federal regulation requires that the state cannot dismiss a Medicaid fair hearing request without good cause and the state Medicaid manual requires that notice be provided before a claim is abandoned, so before dismissing an appeal as abandoned, the state must send out a post-default notice.

For the full text of this decision, go to: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-nyed-2_09-cv-05248/pdf/USCOURTS-nyed-2_09-cv-05248-2.pdf

March 17

Medicaid’s Anti-Lien Provision Applies Only to Living Medicaid Recipients

A Florida court of appeals rules that Medicaid’s anti-lien provision does not apply to a Medicaid lien imposed on a Medicaid recipient’s property after the recipient dies. Estate of Hernandez v. Agency for Health Care Admin. (Fla. Ct. App., 3rd Dist., No. 3D14-2115, Feb. 17, 2016).

Betsy Hernandez died of a rare condition. Her estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the hospital that treated her. The hospital agreed to settle the lawsuit for $700,000, and Medicaid placed a lien on the settlement to recoup medical expenses paid on Ms. Hernandez’s behalf.

The Medicaid agency claimed it was entitled to $262,500 before any wrongful death apportionment. The estate argued that the agency sought money allocated to survivors and that under Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al. v. Ahlborn (547 U.S. 268 (2006)), states cannot assert a lien on portions of a settlement not allocated to medical expenses. The trial court denied the estate’s motion for a hearing, and the estate appealed.

The Florida Court of Appeals, 3rd District, affirms, holding that “the Medicaid Act’s anti-lien provision does not apply to a Medicaid lien imposed against the property of a Medicaid recipient after her death.” The court holds that Ahlborn and Wos v. E.M.A (U.S., No. 12-98, March 20, 2013) do not apply because Medicaid’s anti-lien provision applies only to living Medicaid recipients.

For the full text of this decision, go to: http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D14-2115.pdf

March 14

Group of Experts Recommends Major Changes to Financing and Delivery of Long-Term Care

A diverse group of long-term care policy experts and stakeholders has issued a report proposing major changes in the way long-term care is financed and delivered in the United States. The Long-Term Care Financing Collaborative’s report proposes a new catastrophic long-term care insurance program as well as changes to Medicaid’s long-term care benefit.

The Collaborative spent three years studying long-term care in the U.S., and although its members represent a broad range of ideological views, they were able to agree on a number of key recommendations to pay for and improve long-term care services.

The Collaborative’s main recommendation is to establish a universal catastrophic insurance program aimed at providing financial support to those with high levels of long-term care needs over an extended period of time. The idea is for individuals with high levels of long-term care needs to pay for their own care for one or two years and then receive a lifetime daily benefit. Individuals with lower lifetime incomes would be eligible to receive the catastrophic benefits sooner than individuals with higher incomes.

The Collaborative also recommends changing Medicaid law to provide the same services to institutional and non-institutional recipients. The goal would be to make Medicaid more flexible and responsive to the needs of individuals.

Other recommendations include encouraging private sector initiatives to revitalize long-term care insurance to lower costs and increase enrollment for non-catastrophic risks, and increasing retirement savings and improving education on long-term care costs.

To read the full report, go here: http://www.convergencepolicy.org/ltcfc-final-report/.

For an analysis by collaborative member Howard Gleckman of the Urban Institute, click here.

March 10

Trust Is an Available Asset Because Trustees Have Discretion to Make Distributions

A New York appeals court rules that a Medicaid applicant’s trust is an available asset because the trustees have discretion to make distributions to her. In the Matter of Frances Flannery v. Zucker (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 4th Dept., No. TP 15-01033, Feb. 11, 2016).

Frances Flannery was the beneficiary of a trust that granted her children, as the trustees of the trust, the authority to distribute as much of the principal as they felt in their discretion was necessary to provide for Ms. Flannery’s health and welfare. Ms. Flannery applied for Medicaid, and the state denied her benefits after determining the trust was an available asset.

Ms. Flannery appealed, arguing that the trust is not an available asset because her children refuse to make distributions of the principal to her. After a hearing, the state affirmed the denial of benefits, and Ms. Flannery appealed to court.

The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirms the denial of Medicaid benefits. According to the court, “because the principal of the trust may, in the discretion of [Ms. Flannery’s] children be paid for [Ms. Flannery’s] benefit,” the principal of the trust is an available asset “despite the fact that her children refuse to exercise their discretion to make such payments of principal.”

For the full text of this decision, go to: http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Clerk/Decisions/2016/02-11-16/PDF/0066.pdf

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